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AMBULANCES: HOSPITAL PROPERTY OR NOT? INTERPRETING
THE EXPANDING BOUNDARIES OF EMTALA THROUGH
ARRINGTON v. WONG

I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a hectic night at the emergency department of a very large innercity hospital. Doctors, nurses and staff are rushing around to do their jobs
quickly and efficiently. Patients and family members are beginning to greatly
outnumber the staff. All are complaining about how long they have been
waiting and what they need to be doing right now. New trauma patients are
arriving every few minutes. Doctors are forced to think quickly about what the
best measures would be to help or save a patient. There is little time to rest
and think about one’s next actions, much less whether there has been a
violation of any law. A call comes in from one of the many independently
owned ambulances in the city, and the only thing the staff member answering
the call knows is that the emergency room has been busy all night. If she
allows the ambulance to arrive, one of the many patients already at the hospital
will be forced out into the hallway, possibly causing a delay in his or her
treatment. She informs the nonhospital-owned ambulance that it should go to
the neighboring hospital, even though it is a few blocks away. She concludes
that the injured person can survive, without any adverse effects, for the few
brief moments it will take to get to the next hospital. Anyway, it is not one of
the hospital’s ambulances, and they have three of their own ambulances
coming in. Unfortunately, this hospital is not too busy to be on “diversionary
status.” Did this staff member do anything wrong by turning away this
ambulance, or was it a typical decision made for the benefit of her many
patients?
If this hospital was in any of the states in the Ninth Circuit, this woman
and the hospital would most likely have been charged with a violation of the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act1 (hereinafter
“EMTALA” or “the Act”). On January 22, 2001, the Ninth Circuit in
Arrington v. Wong dealt with a very similar situation to the one described
above—a nonhospital-owned ambulance was turned away from a Hawaiian
hospital and told to go to a neighboring hospital.2 In this case of first

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994 & Supp. 1999).
2. Arrington v. Wong, 237 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001).
1035
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impression, a divided Ninth Circuit held that a hospital cannot turn away a
nonhospital-owned ambulance that calls a hospital (unless the hospital is on
diversionary status) without violating the Act.3 This decision dissolves the
distinction between nonhospital-owned and hospital-owned ambulances—a
distinction that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (hereinafter
“CMS”) specifically included within the regulation.
This Note analyzes the decision of the court in Arrington v. Wong and
whether the decision extends the reach of EMTALA beyond the intent of
Congress. Part II of this Note will give a brief background of EMTALA.4 Part
III will discuss one particular part of the statute—the language of “comes
to”—and how past court decisions and regulations handled the language, later
construed by the Arrington court, especially how the language has been treated
in ambulance cases. Part IV will examine the Ninth Circuit decision and how
both the majority and dissent reached their conclusions. Finally, Part V
analyzes Arrington’s holding and what the social implications may be of this
ruling.
II. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF EMTALA
[N]o person should be denied emergency health care or hospital admittance
because of a lack of money or insurance. I firmly believe the American people
should continue to expect that when they see an emergency sign on a hospital
or free standing clinic they can expect access to emergency care.
Representative Michael Bilirakis of Florida5
“We cannot allow a health care system as advanced as ours to provide
emergency care only to those who can pay. This amendment will ensure that
hospitals live up to their fundamental responsibilities to the public.”
Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts6

In the 1980s, Congress was concerned about the many horror stories being
reported by the media regarding indigent patients being turned away because
they could not pay for treatment.7 One story, for example, was reported in the
Washington Post, which stated that a man with third-degree grease burns was

3. Id. at 1074.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
5. MARK M. MOY, THE EMTALA ANSWER BOOK xix (2d ed. 2000) (quoting
Representative Michael Bilirakis of Florida).
6. Id. at xv (quoting Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts).
7. See id. at xvi; N. GENELL LEE, LEGAL CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IN EMERGENCY CARE 138
(2001); Kim C. Stanger, Private Lawsuits under EMTALA, 12 HEALTH LAW. 27 (2000).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

AMBULANCES: HOSPITAL PROPERTY OR NOT?

1037

turned away from three hospitals because he was unable to pay deposits.8 He
finally arrived at a public hospital seven hours later, carrying an IV bottle that
had been given to him by one of the private hospitals as a precautionary
measure.9 These horrific stories played on the emotions of members of
Congress. As a result, Congress quickly proposed and passed an act dealing
with “patient-dumping” without even holding hearings or considering public
input.10 Therefore, on April 7, 1986, President Reagan signed a law entitled
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, which
contained EMTALA, that addressed emergency medical care for the very
poor.11
A.

Purpose and Scope of EMTALA

Congress designed EMTALA to prevent “patient dumping”—a “hospital’s
transfer of an unstable patient or refusal to provide emergency services based
on a patient’s inability to pay or based on other grounds unrelated to the
patient’s need or the hospital’s ability to provide the services.”12 Although
originally passed to help the indigent and poor of the community, EMTALA
protects all individuals and is not limited to just those who have no insurance
or who lack money.13 EMTALA applies only to those hospitals that participate
in Medicare and have an emergency department.14 However, since most
hospitals rely heavily on Medicare reimbursement, the first requirement does
very little to limit the reach of the Act.15

8. MOY, supra note 5, at xvii (citing Paul Taylor, Ailing Uninsured and Turned Away;
Americans Without Health Coverage Finding Hospitals Doors Closed, WASH. POST, June 30,
1985, at A1).
9. Id.
10. Id. at xxi.
11. Id. at xv; LEE, supra note 7, at 138; Brian E. Kamoie, EMTALA: Reaching Beyond the
Emergency Room to Expand Hospital Liability, 33 J. HEALTH L. 25, 26 (2000).
12. Kamoie, supra note 11, at 26.
13. Julia Ai, Does EMTALA Apply to Inpatients Located Anywhere in a Hospital?, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 549, 551 (2001).
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(2) (1994); Stanger, supra note 7, at 27; BARRY R. FURROW,
ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 771 (4th ed. 2001); Michael J. Frank,
Tailoring EMTALA to Better Protect the Indigent: The Supreme Court Precludes One Method of
Salvaging a Statute Gone Awry, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 195, 198-99 (2000); Kamoie,
supra note 11, at 26.
15. Frank, supra note 14, at 198 n.20 (citing Correa v. Hosp. S. F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1189 (1st
Cir. 1995)).
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Enforcement of EMTALA

Both governmental and private entities share the responsibility of
enforcing EMTALA. First, CMS,16 which runs the federal Medicare program,
may terminate a hospital’s Medicare provider agreement if it has been found to
violate EMTALA.17 Additionally, the Office of Inspector General (hereinafter
“OIG”), which monitors programs of the Department of Health and Human
Services (hereinafter “DHHS”), may impose monetary penalties on both the
offending hospitals and the physicians.18 Finally, “an individual who suffers
personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospital’s violation of
[EMTALA]” has a private right of action under EMTALA against the
hospital.19 Similarly, another hospital, that has suffered a financial loss as a
direct result of another hospital’s violation of EMTALA, can maintain a civil
cause of action.20 Thus, if a hospital is found to have violated EMTALA, it
can lead to very serious repercussions for that particular hospital, ranging from
a fine of $50,000 to a revocation of a hospital’s ability to participate in
Medicare.21
C. The Elements of EMTALA
Generally, if an individual comes to a hospital and solicits emergency care,
a hospital must provide a medical screening examination for that person,
within the hospital’s capabilities.22 EMTALA has three basic requirements
that must be followed by participating hospitals. First, hospitals must provide
every individual seeking medical treatment at the hospital with an “appropriate

16. On June 14, 2001, the Health Care Financing Administration had its name formally
changed to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. See UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES: EMERGENCY CARE—
EMTALA IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 1 n.2 (June 2001), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01747.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2001) [hereinafter GAO
Report]. Thus, in this Note, CMS will be used instead of HCFA.
17. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(f) (2000); Ai, supra note 13, at 556. See also Frank, supra note 14,
at 204.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (1994); Ai, supra note 13, at 556. See also Kamoie, supra
note 11, at 31; Frank, supra note 14, at 204.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1994); Ai, supra note 13, at 558. See also Kamoie, supra
note 11, at 32; Alicia K. Dowdy et al., The Anatomy of EMTALA: A Litigator’s Guide, 27 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 463, 466 (1996); Frank, supra note 14, at 204.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B) (1994); Ai, supra note 11, at 558. See also Kamoie, supra
note 11, at 32-33. For example, a hospital may suffer a financial loss if it was the hospital that
received a patient that was “dumped” by another hospital. Id. at 33. However, so far hospitals
have been very reluctant in reporting EMTALA violations of other hospitals, even though CMS
has stated that a failure to report may result in a termination of a hospital’s provider agreement.
Id.
21. Kamoie, supra note 11, at 31.
22. MOY, supra note 5, at 2.
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medical screening examination” to determine whether the individual has an
“emergency medical condition” or is in active labor.23 Second, if the above
mentioned medical screening examination reveals that an emergency medical
condition or active labor does exist, then the hospital must provide the patient
with any treatment necessary to stabilize him or her.24 Third, and only then,
may the hospital appropriately transfer the previously mentioned individual to
another hospital or facility that can properly treat the condition.25
An EMTALA violation may take place in two ways. First, the violation
can occur if the hospital’s screening examination for the emergency medical
condition was inappropriate.26 Secondly, the violation can happen if it is
shown that, even though the hospital found that an emergency medical
condition existed, the hospital still failed to stabilize appropriately or

23. Section 1395dd(a) provides that “if any individual . . . comes to the emergency
department and a request is made on the individual’s behalf for examination or treatment for a
medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination
within the capability of the hospital’s emergency department.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994).
See also MOY, supra note 5, at 1; Dowdy et al., supra note 19, at 470.
24. Section 1395dd(b) provides:
If any individual . . . comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that the individual
has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide either—
(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further medical
examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition, or
(B) for transfer of the individual to another medical facility in accordance with subsection
(c) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (1994). See also MOY, supra note 5, at 1.
25. Section 1395dd(c) provides:
If an individual at a hospital has an emergency medical condition which has not been
stabilized . . . the hospital may not transfer the individual unless—
(A)(i) the individual . . . after being informed of the hospital’s obligations . . . and of the
risk of transfer, in writing requests transfer to another medical facility,
(ii) a physician . . . has signed a certification that[,] based upon the information
available at the time of transfer, the medical benefits reasonably expected from the
provision of appropriate medical treatment at another medical facility outweigh the
increased risks to the individual and, in the case of labor, to the unborn child from
effecting the transfer, or
(iii) if a physician is not physically present in the emergency department at the time an
individual is transferred, a qualified medical person . . . has signed a certification
described in clause (ii) after a physician . . . in consultation with the person, has made
the determination described in such clause, and subsequently countersigns the
certification; and
(B) the transfer is an appropriate transfer . . . to that facility.
A certification described in clause (ii) or (iii) . . . shall include a summary of the risks and
benefits upon which the certification is based.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c). See also MOY, supra note 5, at 1.
26. MOY, supra note 5, at 1.
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proceeded to transfer the unstable individual without meeting the statutory
safeguards.27
III. DEVELOPMENT OF “COMES TO” IN 42 U.S.C. § 1395DD(A)
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any
individual . . . comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the
individual’s behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition, the
hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within
the capability of the hospital’s emergency department . . . . 28

Like many of the words embedded within the complex statute, the phrase
“comes to” has been subjected to many interpretations and caused much
confusion. Unfortunately, Congress, while defining much of the language of
the statute, failed to explain what it meant by “comes to.”29 Although this
simple phrase does not seem to be a pivotal or controversial part of EMTALA,
it can have serious implications for determining the situations in which
EMTALA applies. Even though regulations and case law have tried to explain
further what “comes to” should encompass, there still appears to be some
confusion on the true meaning and extent of the phrase, especially when it
involves emergency vehicles.
A.

The Courts Try to Determine the Meaning of “Comes to”

Almost immediately after EMTALA was passed, courts began to hear
cases that questioned the meaning of “comes to” in the statute. However,
similar to the statute, the courts also left the term nearly as ambiguous due to
the lack of uniformity among the decisions. From these decisions, the
translation of “comes to” can be categorized into two types: (1) a literal
interpretation that insists on strict physical presence in the emergency room;
and (2) an interpretation that insists on merely physical presence on hospital
property generally.
The first set of cases construed the statute very literally. These courts
interpreted the statute very narrowly and stated that a person did not fall under
EMTALA unless he or she physically entered the emergency room and thus
came to the emergency facility.30 One such case is Miller v. Medical Center of
27. Id. at 1-2.
28. 42 U.S.C § 1395dd(a) (1994) (emphasis added). See supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994) (defining other words such as “emergency medical
condition,” “participating hospital,” “stabilize,” and “transfer.”).
30. Stanger, supra note 7, at 28 (citing Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 884 (4th
Cir. 1992) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that requested treatment anywhere in hospital should
be protected by EMTALA, and holding, instead, that the person must actually present themselves
at the emergency department)). For instance, in McIntyre v. Schick, 795 F. Supp. 777, 780 (E.D.
Va. 1992), a case interpreting the language of the subsection (b) of the statute, the court stated in
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Southwest Louisiana.31 This case concerned a child who became injured in a
car accident.32 His doctor called a nearby hospital requesting that the boy be
admitted to it.33 The hospital stated, however, that since the boy did not have
insurance, it would not accept him, and that his doctor should not send him.34
The Fifth Circuit held that EMTALA did not apply because the boy never
physically came to the hospital, and a mere request by telephone did not satisfy
the “comes to” requirement.35
Additionally, courts have ruled that the statutory language of “comes to”
does not always mean that walking into the emergency room automatically
satisfies the language. In Rios v. Baptist Memorial Hospital System,36 a
primary care physician told his patient that he needed to obtain a second
opinion regarding burns on his arms, and, therefore, sent him to a doctor who
happened to work in the emergency room.37 When entering the emergency
room with his arm raised over his head, Rios stopped in the emergency room to
ask directions to the admitting room.38 When he was refused admittance due
to insurance reasons, he claimed an EMTALA violation against the hospital.39
The Texas court held that merely walking through the emergency department
while en route to another area of the hospital was not the equivalent of
presenting or coming to the emergency department.40
Courts have also viewed the statute more broadly and interpreted
EMTALA as meaning that an individual has “come to” a hospital, even though
not directly through the emergency room, if he or she enters hospital
property.41 However, even with these court opinions, each plaintiff physically
dicta that under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a), a person has to present himself or herself to a hospital’s
emergency department in order to state a claim.
31. Miller v. Med. Ctr. of Southwest La., 22 F.3d 626 (5th Cir. 1994).
32. Id. at 627.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 628-29. The court stated, as follows:
The Plaintiffs, however, would have us extend the hospital’s duty to require it to accept
for emergency treatment any individual who can communicate a request to the emergency
department. We see nothing demonstrably at odds with the purpose of the drafters,
though, in limiting that duty, in accordance with the unambiguous terms of the statute, to
those individuals who come to the emergency department as opposed to any individual
who can get to a telephone.
Id. at 629 n.6. See also Terry O. Tottenham, What Constitutes “Dumping?,” 1 HEALTH L. PRAC.
GUIDE § 9:46 n.2 (2001); Stephen A. Frew, Malpractice by Emergency Department Physician, 47
AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 7.5 (2000).
36. Rios v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys., 935 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. App. 1996).
37. Id. at 801.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 800-01.
40. Id. at 803.
41. See Stanger, supra note 7, at 28.
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entered hospital property somewhere, and therefore, they were not interpreting
the statute all that broadly since the person still had to be on the premises of
the hospital. In Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hospital, the court ruled that
EMTALA applied to an individual who was transferred from the emergency
room to the intensive care unit.42 Additionally the Sixth Circuit stated,
“[h]ospitals may not circumvent the requirements of the Act merely by
admitting an emergency room patient to the hospital then immediately
discharging that patient.”43
B.

CMS’s Attempt to Clarify “Comes to”

After becoming aware of the confusion left by the different courts’
interpretations of the meaning of “comes to,” CMS attempted, in 1994, to
clarify what was meant by this language. According to 42 C.F.R. § 489.24,
“comes to” has been construed to mean the following:
[T]he individual is on the hospital property. [Hospital property includes
ambulances owned and operated by the hospital, even if the ambulance is not
on hospital grounds.] An individual in a nonhospital-owned ambulance on
hospital property is considered to have come to the hospital’s emergency
department. An individual in a nonhospital-owned ambulance off hospital
property is not considered to have come to the hospital’s emergency
department even if a member of the ambulance staff contacts the hospital by
telephone or telemetry communications and informs the hospital that they want
to transport the individual to the hospital for examination and treatment. In
such situations, the hospital may deny access if it is in “diversionary status,”
that is, it does not have the staff or facilities to accept any additional
emergency patients. If, however, the ambulance staff disregards the hospital’s
instructions and transports the individual on to hospital property, the individual
is considered to have come to the emergency department.44

Thus, according to the regulations, an individual has come to the
emergency department when the individual is: (1) on hospital property; (2) in
any hospital department or facility that is located off the main hospital campus;
(3) in an ambulance on hospital ground; or (4) in a hospital-owned ambulance
or helicopter, regardless of whether it is on hospital property.45 Therefore, in
order to determine whether an individual has presented himself to the
42. Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990). In Thornton,
the plaintiff had suffered a stroke and was brought to the emergency room of Southwest Detroit
Hospital. Id. at 1132. Immediately upon entry, she was taken to the Intensive Care Unit of the
hospital. Id. After twenty-one days at Southwest Detroit Hospital, she was released due to the
fact that a rehabilitation center would not accept her. Id. When her condition deteriorated upon
release, she sued claiming an EMTALA violation. Id.
43. Id. See also Stanger, supra note 7, at 28.
44. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b) (2000).
45. Stanger, supra note 7, at 28. See also Dennis M. Barry, Obligations of Provider-Based
Sites, 2 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE § 15:107 (2001); MOY, supra note 5, at 13-14.
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emergency department, it is essential to know the individual’s physical
location, as well as his mode of transportation.46
CMS imposed this broad interpretation of the language of EMTALA so
that hospitals could not turn patients away simply because they entered through
the wrong door or did not make it to the doors but rather stopped at the
driveway.47 Thus, CMS regulations continued to promote the true purpose of
EMTALA—ensuring that all people who need emergency care will receive it,
regardless of wealth—and making sure hospitals could not escape EMTALA
on technicalities.48
C. Expansion of “Comes to” Through Use of Administrative Fines
Even when no official violation has been established nor a case brought
forth, CMS has fined a hospital for what it determined to be improper actions.
Such an instance occurred in Chicago in May 1998.49 CMS fined a Chicago
hospital, even though the injured person did not enter hospital property.50
In May 1998, Christopher Sercye, a teenager, was shot in an act of gang
violence near Ravenswood Hospital, Chicago.51 His friends brought him
within one-half block of the hospital’s emergency department.52 However,
they made it no further when Christopher collapsed.53 His friends went to the
emergency department and requested assistance for Christopher.54 The
medical staff refused to go the one-half block to aid the boy because of a
hospital policy that required all staff to remain on hospital grounds.55 The
hospital staff did recommend that the friends call 911, and told the friends that
when the boy arrived, they would help him.56 However, by the time a police

46. Carel T. Hedlund & Patricia M. McGillan, Noncompliance of Medicare Certified
Hospitals with Responsibility to Provide Treatment in Emergency Cases, 1 HEALTH L. PRAC.
GUIDE § 2:35 (2001).
47. Ai, supra note 13, at 559 (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,098 (June 22, 1994) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. 489.24)). See also McIntyre v. Schick, 795 F. Supp. 777, 781 (E.D. Va.
1992) (EMTALA “is not based on the door of the hospital through which a patient enters”); Frew,
supra note 35, at § 7.5.
48. See discussion supra Part II.A.
49. See generally MOY, supra note 5, at 22-24; Kristine Marie Meece, The Future of
Emergency Department Liability after the Ravenswood Hospital Incident: Redefining the Duty to
Treat?, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 101 (1999).
50. See sources cited supra note 49.
51. Jeremy Manier & William Recktenwald, Boy’s Death Forces Shift in ER Policy; Police
Say Workers Ignored Dying Youth, CHI. TRIB., May 19, 1998, at N1. For further discussion of
the incident, see MOY, supra note 5, at 22-24. See also Meece, supra note 49, 101-03.
52. See sources cited supra note 51.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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officer was able to bring the injured teenager into the emergency room, the
condition of the boy was so severe that he died within minutes of arrival.57
The hospital policy was found legitimate for the protection of the hospital
staff in a very unsafe neighborhood. Moreover, the hospital technically did not
violate EMTALA since the boy never “came to” the emergency department or
hospital grounds. Nevertheless, CMS still chose to take action against the
hospital.58 CMS threatened to revoke Ravenswood Hospital’s Medicare
participation unless it removed its hospital policy of not allowing employees to
leave the premises.59 Additionally, the hospital was fined $40,000.60
Regardless of whether the hospital actually was in violation of EMTALA,
CMS chose to extend EMTALA in this circumstance.61 Since CMS and OIG
are the administrative agencies with the power to fine hospitals for EMTALA
violations,62 hospitals should take this example from Chicago very seriously.
Hospitals must now assume that EMTALA’s coverage also reaches to areas
near the hospital property, and not just on hospital property.63 In essence, due
to CMS’s extension of EMTALA, hospitals must now make the choice of
which is more crucial—letting the staff leave the hospital to get one injured
person or making the staff stay where needed to care for many patients and risk
being fined by CMS.
D. Defining “Comes to” In Regards to Ambulances
The most troubling aspect of defining “comes to” involves the ambiguity
of the statute and federal regulation when discussing hospital-owned
ambulances versus independently owned ambulances. Even before the Ninth
Circuit decided Arrington v. Wong,64 other courts had discussed the meaning of
the concept “comes to” in relation to emergency vehicles.

57. See sources cited supra note 51.
58. MOY, supra note 5, at 23. See also Meece, supra note 49, at 103.
59. See sources cited supra note 51.
60. MOY, supra note 5, at 23; Frank, supra note 14, at 201.
61. MOY, supra note 5, at 23.
62. See infra Part II.B.
63. MOY, supra note 5, at 23. For a further discussion of the implications of this CMS
decision, see id. at 23-24; Meece, supra note 49, at 101. CMS appears to contradict itself by
making this decision. When educating hospitals on EMTALA, CMS states that the hospital is
responsible for patients coming within 250 yards around the main building. Health Care
Financing Administration, Medicare Learning Network (Nov. 12, 2001), at
http://www.hcfa.gov/medlearn/emqsas.htm (last modified July 11, 2001). However, if the facility
is a separate entity from the hospital, even though located within the required yards, it is not
considered part of the hospital for EMTALA purposes. Id. Thus, as stated by CMS, the sidewalk
that Sercye collapsed on should not have been considered hospital property, even though within
250 yards, and the hospital should not have been fined.
64. Arrington v. Wong, 237 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2001). For further discussion of this case,
see infra Part IV.A-C.
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Johnson v. University of Chicago Hospitals

In Johnson v. University of Chicago Hospitals, an infant was on his way to
a hospital in an independently owned ambulance.65 The ambulance called the
hospital base station telemetry nurse who diverted the patient to another
hospital further away.66 The infant eventually died and the mother sued the
base station hospital under EMTALA.67
The Seventh Circuit rejected the mother’s claim that the hospital violated
EMTALA and stated that the infant never “came to” the hospital or its
emergency department.68 Johnson continued by stating that a hospitaloperated telemetry system was distinct from the hospital’s emergency room.
Thus, the infant never arrived on the hospital grounds.69 The hospital was
legally allowed to divert patients if they never reached the hospital property.70
2.

McLaurin v. District of Columbia

In McLaurin v. District of Columbia, the patient, a gunshot victim, was
transported by ambulance to the Emergency Care Center at D.C. General
Hospital.71 Before taking the patient out of the ambulance, the nurse directed
the ambulance to another hospital.72 The patient died while undergoing
surgery at the second hospital.73 The court held that the injured patient had
“come to” the emergency department according to EMTALA once the
ambulance arrived on the hospital property.74 Additionally, the court
concluded that the hospital failed to provide medical screening in response to
the request to treat the patient once he arrived on the property.75
3.

Madison v. Jefferson Parish Hospital Service Dist. No. 1

In Madison v. Jefferson Parish Hospital Service Dist. No. 1, the patient
was severely burned and was transported by an ambulance owned and operated
by West Jefferson Hospital.76 Although West Jefferson Hospital was closest,

65. Johnson v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 982 F.2d 230, 231 (7th Cir. 1993). See also Dowdy
et al., supra note 19, at 474 n.50.
66. Johnson, 982 F.2d at 231.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 233.
69. Id. See also Frank, supra note 14, at 202.
70. See Johnson, 982 F.2d at 231.
71. McLaurin v. District of Columbia, No. CIV.A. 92-2742-NHJ/DAR, 1993 WL 547193, at
*1 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1993).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *3. See also Dowdy et al., supra note 19, at 473 n.44-45.
75. McLaurin, 1993 WL 547193, at *3.
76. Madison v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, No. CIV.A. 93-2938, 1995 WL
396316, at *1 (E.D. La. June 30, 1995).
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the ambulance brought him to Charity Hospital, which then transferred him to
the burn unit at Baton Rouge General Hospital.77 The court ruled that, since
the ambulance was owned and operated by the hospital, West Jefferson
Hospital was liable under EMTALA because the patient “came to” the
emergency department, considering the ambulance hospital property.78
4.

Hernandez v. Starr County Hospital District

In Hernandez v. Starr County Hospital District, Hernandez was injured in
a work-related accident and rendered unconscious.79 A Starr County Memorial
Hospital ambulance arrived at the accident scene, and the Starr County
Memorial paramedic was told by the employer to take him to a different
hospital.80 In response to this request, the ambulance took him to a more
distant hospital.81 Hernandez sued Starr County Memorial Hospital under
EMTALA.82 The district court, following the holding in Madison, held that
the patient “came to” the emergency department, because Starr owned the
ambulance.83
All of these cases seemed to follow a simple pattern determined by the
ownership of the ambulance. The courts concluded that if a patient is
transported by a hospital-owned vehicle, then the patient has “come to” the
emergency room. However, if the patient is in an independently owned
ambulance, the hospital is under no obligation of EMTALA until the
ambulance enters the hospital’s property. While it appeared that the courts
clarified the confusion regarding ambulances by following these two holdings,
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the case below disregarded previous
distinctions.
IV. ARRINGTON V. WONG—FOLLOWING A DIFFERENT PATH
A.

Background Facts of the Case

On May 5, 1996, Harold Arrington, a Hawaiian security guard, had trouble
breathing during his morning commute to work.84 When he arrived at work,

77. Id.
78. Id. at *2. See also Dowdy et al., supra note 19, at 473 n.44-45.
79. Hernandez v. Starr County Hosp. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 970, 971-72 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
See also MOY, supra note 5, at 29-30; EMTALA: Patient ‘Came to’ Emergency Room by Entering
Hospital Ambulance, Court Rules, 8 BNA’S HEALTH L. REP. 663 (Apr. 22, 1999).
80. Hernandez, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
81. See sources cited supra note 79.
82. Hernandez, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
83. Id. at 972-73. See also MOY, supra note 5, at 29-30; EMTALA: Patient ‘Came to’
Emergency Room by Entering Hospital Ambulance, Court Rules, 8 BNA’S HEALTH L. REP. 663
(Apr. 22, 1999).
84. Arrington v. Wong, 237 F.3d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2001).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

AMBULANCES: HOSPITAL PROPERTY OR NOT?

1047

his co-workers called an independently owned ambulance to take Arrington to
the nearest hospital for emergency care.85 The ambulance crew contacted the
closest hospital by radio, the Queen’s Medical Center, to alert the staff that the
patient they were bringing in was “in severe respiratory distress speaking 1-2
words at a time and . . . breathing about 50 times a minute.”86 The on-call
physician, Dr. Wong, inquired about the patient’s primary care physician and
informed the paramedics that they should instead take him to Tripler Army
Medical Center, his primary hospital, and not to Queen’s.87 The ambulance
was then forced to alter its route and go to the more distant hospital.88 At this
point, Arrington’s condition became so severe that shortly after arriving at
Tripler, Arrington died.89
Arrington’s family filed a complaint in federal district court claiming,
among other things, that the hospital violated EMTALA.90 On September 23,
1998, the district court dismissed the family’s complaint stating that under
EMTALA the deceased cannot bring such a claim if he had never “come to”
the emergency room.91 Here, Arrington had never “come to” Queen’s
emergency department and, thus, could not bring an EMTALA claim.92 The
court also concluded that EMTALA only takes effect in cases where the
patient has a “physical presence” in the emergency room.93
B.

The Ninth Circuit Majority Opinion

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether Arrington’s
attempt to arrive at the hospital fell within the scope of EMTALA’s “comes to”
language.94 In other words, the court phrased the issue, as to whether a
hospital must admit patients being transported to the hospital in nonhospitalowned ambulances to meet the EMTALA standard.95 In order to answer this
issue, the court had to determine whether the two asserted meanings of “comes
to” used by the two parties96 could be reconciled by reading the statute, or

85. Id. at 1069.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id..
89. Arrington, 237 F.3d at 1069.
90. Arrington v. Wong, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1153 (D. Haw. 1998).
91. Id. at 1156.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Arrington, 237 F.3d at 1070.
95. Id. at 1072.
96. The appellees argued that the language “comes to the emergency department” in 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) plainly means “arrives at a hospital,” which included the entire hospital and
its grounds, while the appellants claimed that the phrase means also “the act of traveling to the
hospital.” Id. at 1070.
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whether the language in fact was so ambiguous that an alternate source should
be consulted for the answer.97
After unsuccessfully consulting several dictionaries’ definitions of “comes
98
to”, the court examined the DHHS’s regulation99 regarding the definition of
“comes to,” especially the provision dealing with independently owned
ambulances.100 The majority claimed that DHHS gave an “expansive
approach” to the meaning of “comes to.”101 It stated that not only does section
489.24 provide that a nonhospital-owned ambulance has “unquestionably”
arrived at the hospital when it is on the hospital’s premises. Additionally, a
hospital must accept a patient being transported towards the hospital in a
nonhospital-owned ambulance, unless there is a “valid treatment-related
reason” why it should not, for example a diversionary status.102
The majority believed that this “plain language” of the regulation
demonstrated that upon receiving the radio call from the paramedics, Queen’s
hospital was obligated to accept Arrington unless it was under “diversionary
status.”103 Thus, in order for Queen’s hospital to have met the regulations of
EMTALA, the hospital would have had to prove that: (1) there was not enough
emergency staff at the time of the radio contact; (2) by the time the ambulance
would have arrived, there still would not have been adequate staffing; (3) there
97. The court stated:
When a “statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” courts will
generally interpret the statute, unless an agency with the power to construe the statute has
already provided a construction . . . . In that circumstance, the court must determine
whether the agency’s interpretation is “permissible:” if so, that interpretation applies . . . .
Where Congress expressly delegates to an agency the power to construe a statute, we
review the agency’s interpretation under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard; where
delegation is implicit, the agency’s interpretation must be “reasonable.”
Id. at 1070 (citing Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-844 (1984)).
98. The court found that Webster’s Third New Definition Dictionary’s definition was, as
follows: “to ‘move toward or away from something . . . APPROACH,’ or ‘to arrive at a particular
place.’” Id. at 1070-71. Another dictionary definition was
to move from a place thought of as ‘there’ to a place thought of as ‘here’: a) in the second
person, with regard to the speaker [come to me, will you come to the dance tonight?] . . .
c) in the third person, with regard to the person or thing approached, [he came into the
room] [;] to approach or reach by or as by moving toward[;] to arrive or appear.
Id. at 1071 n.3. The third dictionary the court reviewed defined the language as “to ‘move, be
brought towards, or reach a place thought or as near or familiar to the speaker or hearer. Id.
Therefore, all of the dictionaries’ multiple definitions included the different meanings argued by
both parties. Id.
99. See supra Part III.B.
100. See Arrington, 237 F.3d at 1071-72.
101. Id. at 1072. The court claimed that DHHS made the regulation so expansive so that
hospitals could not circumvent the requirements and, thus, prevent patients from gaining access,
which would defeat the true intent of EMTALA. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1072-73.
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was improper equipment at the hospital to treat Arrington’s condition; or (4)
that the necessary equipment was unavailable due to circumstances, such as
being in use already.104 Finally, the hospital would have to prove that Dr.
Wong knew about the above criteria and based his decision to send Arrington
to another hospital on a treatment-related reason.105
The majority concluded that its decision was not contradictory to the two
cases cited to in the lower court opinion—Johnson v. University of Chicago
Hospitals and Miller v. Medical Center.106 The court claimed that Johnson
was distinct since it was a telemetry unit under “partial bypass.” Arrington,
however, involved an emergency room, which was not under “diversionary
status.”107 Therefore, it was proper when the paramedics were turned away
from the Johnson telemetry unit.108 It also claimed that Miller was distinct
since the patient needing admission was already in another hospital’s bed.
Arrington, rather, was in transit to Queen’s.109 Therefore, the court claimed it
did not stray from the meaning and intent of EMTALA.110
C. The Dissenting Opinion
1.

Statutory Interpretation

The dissent in Arrington, unlike the majority, took a rational approach of
interpreting the statutory language that was more consistent with the legislative
intent. Judge Fernandez declared in his dissenting opinion that the majority
interpreted a statute that in fact did not need to be interpreted at all due to its
plain, unambiguous language.111 He stated that the wording of the statute
clearly indicated Congress’ intent for the person to be physically at the
emergency department in order to request services.112 He claimed that it did
not make sense to believe, as the majority did, that “comes to” would mean
“move toward” in the context of the sentence.113 Therefore, since the language
was unambiguous and gave a clear answer, the court should not have
104. Id. at 1073.
105. Arrington, 237 F.3d at 1073.
106. Id. See generally, Johnson, 982 F.2d at 230; Miller, 22 F.3d at 626. See also supra Parts
III.A. & D.1.
107. Arrington, 237 F.3d at 1073. See also Johnson, 982 F.2d at 231. For further discussion
of Johnson, see supra Part III.D.1.
108. Arrington, 237 F.3d at 1073.
109. Id. See also Miller, 22 F.3d at 628-29. For further discussion of Miller, see supra Part
III.A.
110. Arrington, 237 F.3d at 1074.
111. Id. at 1075 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1075 n.2 (“For example, if we say that someone has ‘come home,’ we mean that he
has arrived. We do not mean that he is on the way; to express that, we would say that he is
‘coming home.’”).
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interpreted it any further.114 Fernandez argued that the cases mentioned above
by the majority did actually address the issue at hand and said that the patient
did not arrive at the hospital.115 Additionally, other courts, though not
specifically addressing the issue of “comes to,” have read the language to mean
that the patient must enter or arrive at the hospital itself in order for the
hospital to be held liable under EMTALA.116
2.

Regulatory Interpretation

The majority in Arrington read the regulation117 as stating that the hospital
could only turn away an independently-owned ambulance if it was on
“diversionary status.” Judge Fernandez, however, read the regulation as
providing one instance of when a hospital can deny access, and not the only
time it could deny it.118 Additionally, he stated that even if the majority was
correct about the regulation, then the regulation would be considered invalid
due to the fact that it extends the statute beyond the limits of its unambiguous
language.119 He claimed, “[t]he agency simply does not have the authority to
extend the statute beyond the plain limits set by Congress. Nor does this court,
by the way.”120 In conclusion, the dissent claimed that the decedent’s family
had no cause of action under EMTALA.121 In other words, the dissent would
only allow an EMTALA claim to be brought if the independently-owned
ambulance arrived on hospital property. Otherwise, the hospital has the right
to send it elsewhere, regardless of the hospital’s status. The dissent’s analysis
provides the most rational interpretation of EMTALA regarding
independently-owned ambulances.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION
In this two to one decision, the often-controversial122 Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals has again changed the meaning, intent and extent of a law. The
court expanded the role of EMTALA to include not only hospital-owned
114. Id. at 1075.
115. Arrington, 237 F.3d at 1075-76 (citing Miller, 22 F.3d at 627-30; Johnson, 982 F.2d at
233 n.7).
116. Id. at 1076 (citing Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th
Cir. 1996); Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1192 (1st Cir. 1995); Green v. Touro
Infirmary, 992 F.2d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 1993); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917
F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990)).
117. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24.
118. Arrington, 237 F.3d at 1076.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1076-77.
121. Id. at 1077.
122. For an example of one of its most recent and controversial cases, see Newdow v. U.S.
Congress, 2002 WL 1370796 (9th Cir. June 26, 2002) (holding that a teacher who led the Pledge
of Allegiance violated the Establishment Clause).
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ambulances, but also independently-owned ambulances. With Arrington, the
Ninth Circuit only added more animosity towards the ever-expanding doctrine
of EMTALA. As one critic states, “[a]s in the old sci-fi thriller The Blob,
where ultimately everyone within close proximity of the oozing pink goo from
outer space is drawn into the expanding morass, EMTALA can reach out and
ensnare the unwary and uninitiated medical facility and its emergency
department staff.”123 Unfortunately, that critic will be correct if the Legislature
or Supreme Court does not restrain the boundaries of EMTALA.
Although the majority properly concluded that “comes to” is an ambiguous
term, and, therefore, that it must look to other sources to define the statutory
language,124 the majority opinion, however, analyzed the case incorrectly in a
number of ways. The majority has improperly interpreted not only the
regulation that governs the statute, but also the case law cited by the lower
court. In addition, the court chose to actively exclude other relevant cases and
sources that gave important insight on how far this act should be interpreted.
Due to the Ninth Circuit’s radical opinion, many social ramifications are
foreseeable.
A.

The Court Incorrectly Read the Language of the Regulations

The majority stated that the regulations “unquestionably state” that a
hospital must accept a patient being transported towards the hospital in a
nonhospital-owned ambulance, unless there is a “valid treatment-related
reason” why they should not, for example a diversionary status.125 However, a
closer look at the intent of the regulatory agency, DHHS, reveals that the
court’s analysis actually runs contrary to what the agency wanted.
The text accompanying the federal regulation specifically states the
following:
An individual in a nonhospital-owned ambulance on hospital property is
considered to have come to the hospital’s emergency department. However,
an individual in a nonhospital-owned ambulance located off hospital property
is not considered to have come to the hospital’s emergency department if
someone staffing the ambulance contacts the hospital by telephone or

123. James T. Biggs, Drama in the ER Spills into the Streets—Literally: Federal Law Gives
Hospitals an Expanded Scope of Duty to Treat Emergency Patients, NAT’L L.J., June 18, 2001, at
B12.
124. Although, as the dissent stated, it would appear to be odd for Congress to have meant
that “comes to” means on his or her way, the author believes the majority correctly concluded that
it was an ambiguous term since the statute does not specifically state the definition and the
referring dictionaries’ meanings only continued the ambiguity. Thus, it was relevant for the
majority to look to the regulatory language for clarification. See supra Parts IV.B & C.1.
125. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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telemetry communications and informs the hospital that they want to transport
the individual to the hospital for examination and treatment.126

The text then discusses the importance of such cases as Johnson v. University
of Chicago Hospital127 on the language of the statute. Therefore, it separated
these sentences from the following sentence that discusses “diversionary
status,” implying that these criteria should be considered separately. They
should not be read together, which is what the majority attempted to do. As
the dissent discussed, it appears that in regard to “diversionary status” the
regulation was merely giving one example of when a hospital can turn away an
ambulance.128 Thus, even though the text of the regulation may be confusing
as to the nonhospital ambulance issue, the text accompanying the regulation
makes it particularly clear: the only time a nonhospital-owned ambulance is
covered under EMTALA is when it is specifically located on hospital
grounds.129 Therefore, because the independently owned ambulance with
Arrington was not on hospital grounds, the majority should have determined
that the “plain language” of the regulatory text did not hold Queen’s Hospital
liable under EMTALA for directing the ambulance to another hospital.
Additionally, if the court truly examined the “plain language” of the
regulation it would have noticed that the regulation specifically distinguishes
“nonhospital-owned ambulances” from “hospital-owned ambulances.”130
Thus, common sense shows that a regulatory agency would not discuss
nonhospital-owned and hospital-owned separately if it intended to treat them
the same. It would not make sense to mention them individually if the agency
only meant to provide that “all ambulances are considered to have ‘come to’ an
emergency department.”
B.

The Ninth Circuit Interpreted Key Case Law Incorrectly

Even though the issue before the court in Arrington was never directly
addressed by any other court, the cases that the lower court examined could
have provided aid to the Ninth Circuit if the court had properly interpreted
them. However, the court chose to ignore the similarities of Johnson v.
University of Chicago Hospitals and Miller v. Medical Center of Southwest
Louisiana to this particular case.
Although the majority disregarded Johnson v. University of Chicago
Hospitals,131 closer scrutiny of the case by the court would have drawn
attention to the similarities between the two cases that should not have been

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,098 (June 22, 1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 489.24).
59 Fed. Reg. at 32,098.
See supra Part IV.C.2.
59 Fed. Reg. at 32,098.
42 C.F.R. § 489.24. See also supra Part III.B.
Arrington v. Wong, 237 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001). See also supra Part IV.B.
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ignored. Although one case discussed a hospital-operated telemetry system
and the other discussed an emergency room situation, both deal specifically
with a nonhospital-owned ambulance that was turned away after contacting the
hospitals.132 The court in Johnson addressed this issue squarely: a hospital is
legally allowed to divert patients if they never reach the hospital property even
if the nonhospital-owned ambulance has previously contacted the place.133
Therefore, applying that general rule to Arrington, the Ninth Circuit should
have seen that the nonhospital-owned ambulance carrying Arrington was not
on hospital property, and, therefore, Queen’s Hospital should not be liable
under EMTALA.
Also, the Arrington court read Miller v. Medical Center of Southwest
Louisiana134 too literally. Instead, the majority should have focused on the
major similarities between the two cases. In Miller, the Fifth Circuit explicitly
stated that a mere request by a telephone from a doctor did not satisfy the
“comes to” requirement.135 In Arrington, the only difference was that the
hospital was contacted by radio.136 A person was not on hospital grounds or
property contacted the hospital in both cases. Additionally, the Arrington
majority argued that in Miller the child was already in a hospital bed when his
doctor called the other hospital, and, thus, it was a different situation.
However, this was not even an issue looked at or considered by the Miller
court.137 The only thing that seemed to be important to the Miller court was
that the “call” was made off of hospital property. In fact, the court stated that
it would not:
[E]xtend the hospital’s duty to require it to accept . . . any individual who can
communicate a request . . . . We see nothing demonstrably at odds . . . in
limiting that duty, in accordance with the unambiguous terms of the statute,
to . . . individuals who come to the emergency department as opposed to any
individual who can get to a telephone.138

Thus, the Arrington court should have respected the Miller court in
determining that it also would not extend EMTALA to any individual who can
communicate a request no matter the location of the individual.

132.
133.
134.
IV.B.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1069; Johnson v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 982 F.2d 230, 231 (7th Cir. 1993).
Johnson, 982 F.2d at 233.
Miller v. Med. Ctr. of Southwest La., 22 F.3d 626 (5th Cir. 1994). See also supra Part
Miller, 22 F.3d at 628-29.
Arrington, 237 F.3d at 1073.
Id. See also Miller, 22 F.3d at 628-29.
Miller, 22 F.3d at 629 n.6.
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C. The Court Chose to Disregard Other Crucial Cases
If the majority had looked beyond the two cases discussed above, it would
have recognized a common theme in most EMTALA cases throughout the
years. In all the cases, regardless of how broadly or strictly the courts
interpreted the language, in order to establish an EMTALA violation, the
person must have been physically on the hospital’s property somewhere.139
The property could have been at the emergency room,140 at another door at the
hospital,141 at another department located within the hospital142 or within
hospital-owned vehicles, such as hospital-owned ambulances.143 In all these
circumstances, the courts never ruled that a patient located elsewhere,
including in a independently owned ambulance, constituted coming to the
hospital.144
Additionally, if the majority had examined McLaurin v. District of
Columbia, the court would have seen that it specifically ruled that the patient
had come to the hospital because the nonhospital-owned ambulance had
entered hospital property and not because the patient had merely entered the
ambulance.145 Because the court ruled this way, it is obvious that nonhospitalowned ambulances are not considered hospital property until having entered on
to the premises. Therefore, the Arrington majority should have recognized that
the independently owned ambulance in the case had never arrived at the
hospital, and thus EMTALA was not triggered.
D. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Look at Other Relevant Sources
The Ninth Circuit appears to be the only authority, at this point, which
concludes that the DHHS had intended the same treatment of ambulances
regardless of the ownership or control of the ambulances. Most other
authorities hold the position that nonhospital-owned ambulances are not
subject to EMTALA’s statutory requirements unless they enter hospital
properties.146 One source, intended to explain EMTALA to medical personnel,
states the following:

139. See supra Parts III.A & III.D.
140. See Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 884 (4th Cir. 1992) (patient did not
present herself at emergency department); Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Assn., 741 F. Supp. 1302,
1305 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (patient entered emergency room).
141. See supra text accompanying note 47 (discussing McIntyre v. Schick, citation omitted).
142. See discussion of Thorton v. Southwest Detroit Hospital supra Part III.B.
143. See supra Part III.D.3.
144. See supra Parts III.-A & III.-D.
145. See supra Part III.D.2. Compare supra Part III.D.2 with Madison v. Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 1995 WL 396316 at *2 (holding that patient is considered to have come
to the hospital when entering hospital-owned ambulance).
146. See MOY, supra note 5, at 29; LEE, supra note 7, at 139; Frank, supra note 14, at 201.
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[T]he regulation does not extend to leased ambulances or contract ambulance
services; therefore, a leased (not owned) ambulance may be diverted
elsewhere, even for economic reasons, prior to arrival onto hospital property.
On the other hand, ambulances (or helicopters) owned by a hospital could risk
violating EMTALA if they transport a patient to another hospital rather than
their own hospital before fulfilling EMTALA transfer criteria.147

The Ninth Circuit, instead of breaking new ground and risking being overruled
by the Supreme Court of the United States, should have looked at the other
sources of interpretation to realize the obvious—the regulations do not apply to
nonhospital-owned ambulances which are not on hospital property.
E.

Social Implications of Arrington v. Wong

The social implications of the Ninth Circuit’s expansive interpretation of
EMTALA, that hospitals are obligated to accept all ambulances, regardless of
ownership, unless under diversionary status, may be substantial and affect
everyone within the nexus of emergency health care. Although Arrington v.
Wong would only effect Ninth Circuit states, many of the district courts and
other circuits will look at this case persuasively since it was a case of first
impression and possibly opt to rule in accordance.148 Thus, the ramifications
of this decision could affect the whole country—at least until the Supreme
Court decides to stop the oozing of EMTALA that the Ninth Circuit has only
encouraged.
The people who will be most affected by this new decision will be those
working in the emergency departments at hospitals, and the hospitals
themselves. Many doctors have already complained that the emergency
departments are understaffed.149 Additionally, many doctors are fearful of the
liability risk of being an ER doctor, especially the EMTALA risk, now that risk
has increased dramatically.150 One doctor stated, “We are in a crisis in this
country because of this law . . . Doctors have learned that if their name is up on
the board in the emergency room and they can’t respond in time, they are
responsible . . . A lot say, ‘Why take on the responsibility?’”151 Thus, fewer
physicians are joining hospital staffs and participating in emergency
department on-call panels because “EMTALA leads to on-call physicians

147. MOY, supra note 5, at 29. See also Hedlund & McGillen, supra note 46, § 2:35 (“The
patient is not considered to have come to the emergency department if in a nonhospital owned
ambulance which is not on the hospital grounds, even if the ambulance has contacted the hospital
by telephone or telemetry communications.”) (emphasis added).
148. See Biggs, supra note 123, at B12.
149. See generally Tanya Albert, Ruling Extends EMTALA’s Reach to Ambulance Contact,
AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS, Mar. 5, 2001, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/scipubs/amnews/pick_01/gvsb0305.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2001).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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providing uncompensated care” and other liability risks.152 With this
expansive court ruling, many more physicians may hesitate before working in
the emergency room.
Doctors are also very nervous about this ruling because it will affect the
level of patient care in this country in two ways. First, some physicians are
worried that the quality of care will actually decrease in this country due to the
Ninth Circuit opinion, rather than increase it.153 They fear that the ruling has
taken the decision-making capability away in emergency situations from the
people who know best—the doctors—and this will only hurt the quality of
patient care.154 For example, a doctor may be afraid to tell an ambulance to go
to another hospital, even though the other hospital may be more suitable for
handling the emergency, because he or she is afraid that he will commit an
EMTALA violation.155 In addition, some specialists are limiting the number of
procedures for which they have credentials and are not seeking hospital
privileges in an effort to avoid being on call.156 This has resulted in a decrease
of services provided at certain hospitals.157 As one doctor succinctly explains,
“If a doctor [does not] accept the patient, even if the judgment was right, it puts
him or her under federal scrutiny . . . Why take on the liability if you don’t
have to?”158
Doctors are also fearful that the Arrington decision will greatly affect the
hospitals that need the most relief—the inner-city hospitals. Inner-city
hospitals tend to rely on private or governmental, nonhospital-owned,
ambulances instead of owning their own. Smaller, more rural hospitals,
however, have their own ambulances.159 These inner-city hospitals are the
hospitals that require the most staff, doctors and financial assistance.
However, if the doctors already do not want the extra headache of being an
emergency room doctor, then this expansion to EMTALA will most likely

152. GAO Report, supra note 16, at 2. The source states that this reduction could also be due
to other factors, such as an increase in procedures being done in nonhospital settings; however the
source also did not deny that part of the reduction may be due to EMTALA. Id. Hospital and
physician representatives have stated that physicians already try to limit their time on call or
completely avoid being on the on-call panel. Id. at 13.
153. See Albert, supra note 149.
154. Id.
155. Id. See also Emergency Care: Estate of Patient Who Didn’t Enter Hospital Can Bring
EMTALA Claim, Ninth Circuit Rules, BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REP., Jan. 24, 2001. Doctors
have stated that they are frustrated due to the confusing regulations and when they are to be
applied. GAO Report, supra note 16, at 25. This confusion most likely has increased due to the
Christopher Sercye incident and this Ninth Circuit decision. See supra Parts III.C & IV.B.
156. GAO Report, supra note 16, at 13-14.
157. Id.
158. See Albert, supra note 149.
159. Emergency Care: Estate of Patient Who Didn’t Enter Hospital Can Bring EMTALA
Claim, Ninth Circuit Rules, BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REP., Jan. 24, 2001.
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drive them away, leaving the inner-city emergency rooms understaffed.160
Additionally, if inner-city hospitals are constantly fined for turning down
patients due to a of lack of doctors, then the hospitals may not be able to afford
to keep their emergency room doors open and have to close down a much
needed hospital emergency room in the area. For these reasons, the American
Medical Association in December of 2000 voted to develop an action plan to
determine how to prevent EMTALA from expanding beyond its original scope
intended by Congress.161 Additionally, the Office of Inspector General has
agreed to study the effects of EMTALA due to these recent changes.162
This decision will also hurt hospitals in another way. Hospitals have
control over their own ambulances, and thus, have the right to hire competent
people to work in the ambulances and fire those who appear to put the hospital
at risk. However, hospitals do not have this same control over the
independently owned ambulances. Therefore, with this decision, hospitals
may now be liable for conduct of the paramedics over which they have no
control. This appears to put an undue burden on hospitals throughout the
country that use independently owned ambulances. This burden may cause
many hospitals to stop using contracted ambulatory services or lose enough
money so that they are forced to close their emergency room doors.
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly stated in Arrington that if it did not rule in
such a way, a hospital could easily circumvent EMTALA. The court feared
defeating the purpose of EMTALA, including providing indigent care and
stopping patient dumping.163 However, this statement is incorrect. If the court
would have ruled opposite, there are other ways in which the Act’s purpose
would be fulfilled. First of all, the regulations specifically state that if an
ambulance, turned away from a hospital, still enters hospital property, the
hospital is liable under EMTALA.164 Therefore, if an ambulance disagrees
with the medical personnel at the hospital and thinks that it is detrimental to
the patient if it goes to another hospital farther away, the ambulance can still
come to the hospital, regardless of the advice. Therefore, the patient will still
be receiving the proper care under the purpose of EMTALA.
Secondly, if a hospital chooses to send the ambulance to a more distant
hospital, there are still many regulations that will hold the hospital accountable
for a bad judgment. The refusal to accept the radio request may represent a
violation of other federal or state requirements, such as the Hill-Burton Act or

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See generally Albert, supra note 149.
Id.
Id.
Arrington, 237 F.3d at 1072.
42 C.F.R. 489.24. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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medical malpractice.165 In addition, some states have statutes that require
hospitals to accept patients in transport by any ambulance, regardless of
ownership.166 Therefore, the hospital will still be wary of making decisions to
send away patients, thus promoting the intention of EMTALA without
stretching EMTALA.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Arrington v. Wong has only left the already
confusing world of EMTALA more inconclusive and ambiguous—the one
thing it was trying to prevent. As the lower court stated in its decision, to rule
for the plaintiffs that Arrington came to the emergency room would lead down
“a slippery slope for which there is no logical end.”167 That is exactly what
will happen with this rule. Where is EMTALA’s reach to stop? With this
decision and the Christopher Sercye incident,168 EMTALA has already
encroached on places that it should never have reached—into the nonhospitalowned ambulance off the property and to patients who are not on hospital
grounds. These decisions may very well cause a breakdown in our already
ailing emergency care system. The Supreme Court and Congress both need to
define the boundaries of this ever-expanding statute and decide that
nonhospital-owned ambulances are not hospital property under EMTALA. If
they do not take action soon, this statute may eventually be construed by courts
to encompass anyone who has had even the most remote connection with a
hospital. Such a decision is well beyond the true intentions of Congress when
it originally enacted EMTALA in 1986.
TRICIA J. MIDDENDORF*

165. MOY, supra note 5, at 16. The Hill-Burton Act provides funds to hospitals if the
hospitals provide a “reasonable volume of services” to “persons unable to pay therefore” and also
services to “all persons residing in the territorial area of the [hospital].” Id. at 59 n.44.
166. Richard M. Ellis, Access to Emergency Services and Care in Florida, FLA. B.J., Jan.
1998, at 29-30 (1998). A Florida statute requires that its hospitals must accept emergency
patients when contacted by a two-way radio en route to the hospital by ambulance, regardless of
ownership. Id.
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168. See supra Parts III.C & IV.B.
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